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IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE (STATION) HOUSE?:
REASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF




The vast majority of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the
last century has been dedicated to parsing the physical and in-
tangible boundaries of the home, developing the expectation of
privacy, and, as of late, exploring the constitutional implica-
tions of an increasingly electronic society. In the midst of this
development, one major area has quietly fallen by the wayside
- the preservation of bodily integrity. As technology has ren-
dered the human body an ever-increasing source of crucial evi-
dence, the Supreme Court has remained largely silent on the
government's power to harvest information through medical
procedures. Since the Court's consideration of the constitutio-
nality of compelled blood draws in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Fourth Amendment questions atten-
dant to bodily evidence have been largely left to the states. This
Article examines a narrow subset of that state-level develop-
ment: non-consensual DWI blood draws. A review of the state
statutory and jurisprudential applications of Schmerber reveals
increasing disagreement over the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment when police seek to recover fleeting evidence of blood al-
cohol content. Based on this review, this Article suggests a
number ofpolicy proposals designed to better insure police stay
within the Fourth Amendment strictures of Schmerber while al-
so procuring the most effective evidence possible.
Associate, Jones Day; J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Southern Methodist University.
Special thanks to my wife Tori and my good friend and former co-clerk David Monteiro for their
ideas, editing, and assistance throughout the process.
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A nearly forty-five year-old debate with constitutional implications was
rekindled recently by a decision from an intermediate appellate court in Fort
Worth, Texas. On November 5, 2009, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Second
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District, ruled that police officers violated Christi Lynn Johnston's Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure when, following a DWI
arrest, the officers physically restrained her at the police station and drew her
blood themselves. Johnston's arrest and the decision to draw her blood without
her consent were nothing remarkable. Instead, it was the decision of the offic-
ers-trained in basic blood draws but hardly qualified phlebomists-to perso-
nally undertake the task of procuring a blood sample in a medically unaccepta-
2ble way that elevated a simple DWI to a matter of constitutional importance.
The Johnston case, though lacking far-reaching precedential value, represents
the full realization of the precise constitutional concerns that accompanied the
Supreme Court's original acceptance of compelled bodily invasions for the re-
covery of evidence in Schmerber v. California.3
With the advances in forensic science in the intervening decades since
the Schmerber decision, the human body has become an increasingly important
source of valuable, necessary, and expected evidence. In that same time, the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence underlying bodily seizures has diverged along
numerous and incongruous paths in the various federal circuits and state court
systems. Nowhere has this development been more prolific or more divergent
than the area of DWI blood draws for the purpose of accurately assessing blood
alcohol content (BAC). The widespread criminalization of driving with the
specific BAC of 0.08%4 combined with the primary authority given blood tests
over all other forms of assessing intoxication5 has made the need for clear con-
stitutional guidance all the more important. Perhaps the quintessential "evanes-
cent evidence,"6 the always time-sensitive nature of seizure and analysis of
blood for the purposes of ascertaining BAC pits fundamental Fourth Amend-
ment concerns7 against societal interests in protecting innocent citizens from the
consequences of drunk driving.
I State v. Johnston, 305 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. App. 2009).
2 Id. at 759-60; see also John Council, Questions Remain After Decision on Blood Draws in
DWIArrests, TEXAS LAW., Nov. 16, 2009, at 1, 19.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
4 See generally .08 BAC Illegal per se Level, 2 TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 (Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/new-fact-sheet03/fact-sheets04/Laws-08BAC.pdf (discussing
the development and widespread adoption of the 0.08 % standard).
5 Jennifer L. Pariser, Note, In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol Presumptions in
State Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 141, 149 (1989) (discussing the primacy afforded
blood tests relative to breath or urine tests).
6 Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 854, 854 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fernandez, J., dissenting)
("Schmerber and the other cases in this area are driven by the fact that evidence of intoxication is
indeed evanescent.").
7 See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (discussing that the right to
the dignity of one's bodily integrity is as old as the common law and has been mentioned as being
incorporated in the right of personal security identified in the 39th Article of Magna Carta).
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This Article addresses the apparent constitutional boundaries surround-
ing this critically important area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as an-
nounced by the Supreme Court and developed throughout the country. Part I
explores the medical and physiological concerns underlying society's interest in
forcibly removing blood from a suspect's body as well as the mechanics of as-
sessing intoxication. Part II takes a broad look at the development of constitu-
tional law on the issue of bodily intrusions and the interplay between various
forms of seizures. Additionally, this part will also survey the measures underta-
ken by numerous states to strengthen Fourth Amendment protections of bodily
integrity through statutory devices. Part III will examine Schmerber's progeny
in detail. Specifically, it will address the general bifurcation of Schmerber's
instruction: whether a constitutional blood draw requires just a qualified techni-
cian or both a qualified technician and a medical setting. It then concludes by
proposing a non-elemental, holistic approach to Schmerber's reasonableness
analysis. Part IV will detail the wide range of policy concerns informing the
blood draw methods and protocols used around the country. Finally, Part V
concludes by suggesting best practices for limiting liability, protecting Fourth
Amendment rights, and securing DWI convictions, as drawn from the array of
currently employed operating procedures.
I. THE MEDICINE AND SCIENCE BEHIND COMPULSORY BAC TESTING
METHODOLOGIES
Taken in isolation, the concept of forcibly removing bodily fluids to as-
sess BAC-much less in the environs of a police station and with other options
available-appears unjustifiable. The science behind the evidence at the heart
of DWI prosecutions represents a necessary starting point in understanding the
development of this specialized area of Fourth Amendment law and why the
extraordinary practice of compelled blood draws is, in fact, necessary. First, the
methods of assessing intoxication vary from an officer's generally non-invasive
request for a sample of a suspect's breath to forced restraint for blood draws or
catheterization. Although each of these methods yields evidence of intoxica-
tion, their relative strengths and weaknesses inform the discussion of why blood
draws represent such a substantial portion of DWI seizures. Second, the ephe-
meral nature of BAC evidence dictates that time is of the essence in pursuing
proof of intoxication. Yet the realities of alcohol absorption and elimination
represent an often-overlooked factor in considering the temporal boundaries
justifying extreme measures like station house blood draws. Accordingly, this
section briefly reviews the medical science underlying the process of assessing
intoxication and the mechanics of producing the all-important quantified BAC
figures that underlie virtually all DWI convictions.
384 [Vol. 113
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A. Methods ofAssessing Intoxication
With the debunking of traditional "common sense" methods of assess-
ing alcohol consumption and intoxication,8 breath, blood, and urine tests have
emerged as the most trusted sources of confirming evidence in DWI prosecu-
tions.9 Though often treated as interchangeable options, important differences
between each of these means of detecting intoxication inform the heavy reliance
on blood tests in a large number of DWI investigations. Moreover, the varying
degree of invasion and discomfort required for each test has produced, in itself,
wide-ranging divergence in the caselaw. Ultimately, the judicial acceptance of
blood draws as an accurate middle ground between the Breathalyzer and the
catheter forms the foundation of an increasingly permissive Fourth Amendment
standard governing these seizures.
1. The Breath Alcohol Test
The tried-and-true, standby method for assessing intoxication is the
breath alcohol test, commonly referred to by its commercial name, the "Breatha-
lyzer." In reality, the Breathalyzer is one of three predominant types of alcohol
detection devices: 1) the Breathalyzer; 2) the Intoxilyzer; and 3) the Alcosen-
sor.10 All three types of breath alcohol tests require an individual to exhale a
deep breath for analysis." Once a breath sample is captured, each device em-
ploys a different method of measuring breath alcohol content from which blood
alcohol content can be extrapolated.12 The Breathalyzer contains chemicals that
8 See, e.g., Spurgeon Cole & Ronald H. Nowaczyk, Field Sobriety Tests: Are They Designed
For Failure?, 79 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 99, 101-02 (discussing police officers who were
shown videos of individuals performing various field sobriety tests incorrectly asserted that the
tests demonstrated intoxication in forty-six percent of the videos presented); Herbert Moscowitz et
al., Police Officers' Detection of Breath Odors From Alcohol Ingestion, 31 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
& PREVENTION 175, 179-80 (demonstrating police officers' inability to accurately assess alcohol
or predict intoxication when confronted by subjects with "alcohol on their breath").
9 The most telling endorsement of chemical test evidence is the widespread criminalization
and admissibility of refusals to submit to a blood, breath, or urine screening. See Jennifer E.
Dayok, Comment, Administrative Driver's License Suspension: A Remedial Tool That is Not in
Jeopardy, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1151, 1153 n.9, 1155 n.11 (1996) (surveying many of the state res-
ponses to noncompliance with chemical testing).
10 Tech 101: How Stuff Works, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at 8, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jun/28/news/tt-16067 [hereinafter Tech 101].
"1 Id.
12 Pariser, supra note 5, at 149-54 (providing an extensive discussion of the retro-
extrapolation method used to calculate alcohol content). Also of note, none of the breath alcohol
tests actually measure BAC. Instead, all of these devices measure breath alcohol content or
BrAC. That measurement is first subjected to a BAC conversion before applying the retro-
extrapolation calculation discussed in Pariser. See E. John Wherry, Jr., DWI Blood Alcohol Test-
ing: Responding to a Proposal Compelling Medical Personnel to Withdraw Blood, 18 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 655, 658 n.19, 663-67 (1994) (explaining the difference between BAC and BrAC,
as well as the BrAC-to-BAC extrapolation process). For a discussion of the possible problems
2011] 385
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react with alcohol in the air causing them to change color and produce a variety
of new compounds. The device then compares the resulting mixture with a con-
trol vial to reach a numerical determination.13 The Intoxilyzer works slightly
differently. As succinctly explained by one Ninth Circuit panel, "[t]he Intox-
ilyzer works by shining a beam of infrared light through a chamber full of un-
contaminated air . . .. When new air is breathed into the chamber, the amount
of light will be decreased if there is alcohol in the breath, because alcohol, ap-
parently colorless, has a color just past red in the rainbow. The decrease in light
due to alcoholic breath is measured and converted into an alcohol percentage."' 4
Finally, the Alcosensor converts alcohol in the air into electricity by way of a
chemical reaction, and the resulting electrical current is measured and converted
into a BAC reading.15 Despite variances in their inner workings, all three breath
alcohol tests, when properly administered with calibrated equipment, have been
almost universally accepted as reliable sources of BAC in DWI prosecutions. 1
As is relevant to this discussion, the breath alcohol test's biggest short-
coming is that it requires cooperation from suspects. All three breath methods
require an individual to inhale deeply and exhale completely into a fixed open-
ing. None of the extant methods of testing breath alcohol content lend them-
selves to compelled sampling. Moreover, many states require police officers to
administer two or more breath tests to a suspect to confirm the accuracy of ini-
tial results-thus further increasing the required cooperation between often in-
toxicated suspects and officers.1 7 As such, while generally accepted and compa-
ratively non-invasive, the various approaches to breath alcohol testing simply do
not work with non-compliant individuals. Once a suspect refuses, an officer has
no choice but to abandon this least offensive measure and move to blood or
urine testing immediately to avoid the destruction of evidence through the
body's normal absorptive processes.
with BrAC-to-BAC conversion, see Wayne A. Morris, DWI, The CHAMPION, August 2009, at 44,
available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/0/c231d5f57fccl 5f485257643005f5782
?OpenDocument.
13 State v. Williams, 480 A.2d 1383, 1385 (R.I. 1984); Tech 101, supra note 10, at 8; see also
How Many Drinks Does It Take?, INTECH, Feb. 28, 2001, at 24, available at 2001 WLNR
4335245 [hereinafter How Many].
14 United States v. Brannon, 146 F.3d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Tech 101, supra
note 10, at 8.
15 Tech 101, supra note 10, at 8; see also How Many, supra note 13, at 24.
t6 See generally State v. Chun, No. 58,879, 2007 N.J. LEXIS 39 (Feb. 13, 2007) (describing
the process by which all three methods garnered widespread scientific and legal acceptance) affid,
State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008).
17 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.51 (2010) (requiring two samples); NEV. REV. STAT. §
484C.200 (2010) (same); and Wis. STAT. § 343.305 (2010) (same).
386 [Vol. 113
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2. The Urinalysis Test
The urinalysis test occupies the opposite end of the spectrum from
breath alcohol tests. At minimum, a urinalysis test requires a suspect to be ob-
served urinating to insure the integrity of the sample tested.' 8 Where a suspect
complies, the urine sample is merely collected and submitted for chemical test-
ing. The more extreme scenario arises, however, when an individual refuses to
comply and officers resort to compelled urinalysis by catheterization. In such a
scenario, a suspect is typically physically restrained while the catheter is in-
serted by a medically qualified individual.19 This process has been described as
both excruciatingly painful and humiliating.20 A urine sample is extracted by
way of a catheter and submitted for laboratory testing to ascertain the chemical
content.21
As this short description makes clear, urinalysis for the purposes of as-
sessing BAC is problematic at best. Numerous courts have recognized that
forced removal of urine samples for chemical testing may be widespread and
not per se unconstitutional, but it is an undesirable method likely to produce
22constitutional violations. Moreover, even where suspects comply with testing,
the scientific community has cast a skeptical eye on urinalysis after research has
revealed that it may not be an accurate predictor of BAC.23  Even those re-
searchers willing to stand by the results of urinalysis BAC tests require added
precautions such as repeated tests or sample extraction over a period of time to
guarantee accuracy.24 In fact, some jurisdictions affirmatively require that an
18 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
19 E.g., Forced Catheterization Used in DUI Case: Suit Claims Police, Hospital Acted Impro-
perly, WLWT.CoM (Sept. 3, 2009, 8:59 AM), http://www.wlwt.comI/health/20703731/detail.html
[hereinafter Forced Catheterization] ("[The suspect's] attorney said his client was shackled to a
gurney and had a catheter inserted against his will."); Tube Inserted into Man Who Refused to
Give Urine Sample, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 4, 2008, 6:10 PM),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/200425971 1_apwaforcedcatheterization.html
[hereinafter THE SEATTLE TIMES] ("[H]e was held down kicking and screaming .... And a tube
was inserted into his bladder to withdraw the urine.... A settlement was reached Friday in which
he was paid $15,000 . . . .").
20 See Forced Catheterization, supra note 19; see also THE SEATTLE TIMES, supra note 19.
21 See Forced Catheterization, supra note 19; see also THE SEATTLE TIMES, supra note 19..
22 Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Ellis v. City of San Diego,
176 F.3d 1183, 1192 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying qualified immunity where plaintiff alleged he was
sedated and forced to submit to catheterization procedure); Levine v. Roebuck, No. 06-6040-CV-
NKL-P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77073, *16-17 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2007) (finding catheterization
of sixty-eight year-old man in non-DWI circumstances was an unreasonable seizure because it
required a "gross personal indignity").
23 Charles L. Winek et al., The Unreliability of Using a Urine Ethanol Concentration to Pre-
dict a Blood Ethanol Concentration, 25 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 277, 280 (1984).
24 Alfred A. Biasotti & Thomas E. Valentine, Blood Alcohol Concentration Determined from
Urine Samples as a Practical Equivalent or Alternative to Blood and Breath Alcohol Tests, 30 J.
FORENSIC Sc. 194, 206 (1985); John H. Mulholland & Francis J. Townsend, Bladder Beer -A
2011]1 387
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initial urine test be discarded entirely. 25 Though the original method of assess-
ing BAC, these significant drawbacks have caused urinalysis to increasingly fall
out of favor with police, prosecutors, and courts alike given the greater ease of
administering breath tests to cooperative suspects and the relatively better op-
tion of forcibly extracting blood from more recalcitrant individuals.
3. The Blood Test
The middle ground of BAC testing has always belonged to the blood
test. The process of extracting blood for the purposes of assessing BAC is no
different from a standard blood test administered for medical reasons.26 The
only minor variation between a BAC test and a standard blood test is that the
site of extraction for BAC testing typically must be sterilized with a special non-
alcohol based solution in order to avoid tainting the specimen. 27 Unlike admi-
nistering a breath test or collecting a urine sample, extracting blood typically
requires a significant degree of training. Though the legal implications and re-
gional variations in required qualification are discussed at length below, the
general standard is that an individual must at least have received certification as
a phlebotomist before performing blood draws for law enforcement purposes. 2 8
Blood tests are also often regarded as the gold standard of DWI evi-
dence. While breath tests and voluntary urinalysis tests are easy to administer,
they are also easily corrupted by errors on the part of the administering police
officers. 29 Blood tests, on the other hand, are typically performed by medical
New Clinical Observation, 95 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. CLINICAL CLIMATOLOGICAL Ass'N 34
(1984) (acknowledging that the spontaneous production of alcohol within the bladder itself can
taint subsequent chemical testing).
25 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 1219.2 (2010) (requiring a voiding of the bladder before
taking the tested sample); Tucker v. State, No. CACROl-6, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 253, at *3
(Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (citing ARKANSAS DEP'T OF HEALTH, ARKANSAS REGULATIONS FOR
ALCOHOL TESTING § 3.30 (1995)). But see Hayes v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 773 N.W.2d 134, 138
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (declining to require voiding absent statutory or regulatory mandate); State
v. Jones, 721 A.2d 903 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (same).
26 This fact, though largely empirically true, is essentially a judicial fact established by the
frequent citation to Schmerber's assertion that blood draws are merely a commonplace occurrence
of little consequence in everyday life. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). See
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625; United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing Skinner for the same proposition); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.
1992); United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Quander, 440
F.3d 489,496 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
27 See, e.g., State v Hanners, 774 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (suppressing test evidence
where alcohol-based swab used). But see State v. Phillips, 790 P.2d 390 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)
(admitting BAC results notwithstanding failure to follow proper sterilization procedures).
28 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1388 (2010); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23158 (West 2010);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 2010) (codifying a similar list but requiring physician
supervision).
29 See text accompanying note 12 (breath) and supra notes 22-23 (urine).
388 [Vol. 113
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professionals.3 0  More specifically, with rare exception such as the Johnston
case discussed above, most blood draws are performed by doctors, nurses, and
phlebotomy technicians. 31 Additionally, the process of analyzing the blood is
conducted by forensic specialists or medical personnel.32 As such, unlike a
roadside breath test or station house urine collection, blood tests carry with them
an air of independent, scientific analysis because police officers rarely come
into direct contact with the tested specimen.
Yet blood tests suffer from a single debilitating problem-time. As dis-
cussed at greater length below, the human body absorbs alcohol rather quickly,
thus eliminating valuable evidence.3 3 Consequently, blood testing demands
quick extraction to achieve an accurate result-so much so that some states have
statutory requirements designating the maximum lapse of time between arrest
and extraction.34 Given the general preference for blood draws in medical set-
tings, the need to reduce the time between arrest and blood draw often requires
police officers to act quickly and to immediately take suspects to a local hospital
to preserve evidence. It is this fundamental, key issue-the need for quick ac-
tion-that presents the primary problem with blood testing for DWI purposes
and, perhaps even more than the nature of the intrusion itself, has led to the de-
tailed development of Fourth Amendment blood seizure jurisprudence.
B. Alcohol Absorption Over Time and Its Effect on the Assessment of In-
toxication
Blood tests represent the most readily available and generally accepta-
ble means of assessing the BAC of non-compliant suspects. As noted above,
though, the fleeting presence of alcohol in the blood stream after consumption
reduces the success of blood tests to a race against the clock, and the parameters
of that race have formed the foundation of a broad swath of the Fourth Amend-
ment guidance controlling police conduct in this area. The source and extent of
this exigency is best understood by briefly considering the natural processes that
causethe elimination of alcohol in the human bloodstream and the effect of
those processes on the assessment of intoxication through the various available
tests but, most importantly, blood testing.
Though variations exist, the following standards represent the generally
accepted premises upon which the scientific and medical communities assess
alcohol intoxication. One serving of alcohol is defined as a single twelve-ounce
30 See cases cited supra note 27; see also infra Part II.B.2.
31 See cases cited supra note 27; see also infra Part II.B.2.
32 See cases cited supra note 27; see also infra Part 1I.B.2..
3 See infra Part I.B; see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (discussing the absorption and
elimination of alcohol in the blood stream as an exigency).
3 See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3802 (2010) (requiring the tested blood sample to be
extracted no more than two hours after operation of a motor vehicle).
2011] 389
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beer, six-ounce glass of wine, or 1.5-ounce serving of distilled liquor.35 Such a
serving contains ten to fifteen grams of ethanol and, on an empty stomach, will
reach a maximum concentration in the blood stream thirty to ninety minutes
after consumption.36 The average individual will absorb 3.3 millimoles of alco-
hol per hour or, stated otherwise, the body can remove fifteen milligrams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood per hour.3 7 Notably, at higher concentra-
tions, such as after three pints of beer or six shots of whiskey, the rate at which
alcohol is removed from the blood drops dramatically and alcohol levels will
register at the peak of the BAC curve for much longer. After absorption
peaks, BAC will fall at a rate generally tracing a half-life curve until alcohol is
completely eliminated up to eight hours after consumption.39
The consequences of this rapid absorption process are perhaps best em-
bodied in the state rules governing the use of blood evidence in DWI prosecu-
tions. In Indiana, a BAC test will only create a presumption of intoxication-
and then only a rebuttable presumption-if administered less than three hours
after a law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the suspect had
committed a DWI offense. 40 Hawaii, Ohio, and Wisconsin also allow the ad-
mission of a BAC test only so long as it was administered within three hours of
operation of a vehicle.4 1 Some states go even further and require testing within
two hours.42 Only a small number of states permit the admission of BAC testing
completed at any time after arrest. 4 3 This sampling of state statutes reveals both
the legislative effort to acknowledge the realities of blood alcohol elimination
and, perhaps more importantly, the dispositive effect of a relatively inflexible
timeline on the entire evidentiary weight of BAC test results.
C. The Mechanics of BA C Calculation
Finally, before turning to the Fourth Amendment, it is important to un-
derstand the meaning of the all-important BAC figures that compelled blood
draws are attempting to ascertain in the first place. First, the BAC test adminis-
tered by the arresting officer produces an initial figure. In the case of the breath
3 Patrick G. O'Connor, Alcohol, THE MERCK MANUAL ONLNE (July 2008),
http://www.merck.com/mmpe/secl5/chl98/chl98g.html.
36 Id
37 Alex Paton, ABC ofAlcohol: Alcohol in the Body, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 85, 86 (2005).
38 Id
39 Id at Fig. 4.
40 IND. CODE § 9-30-6-2(c) (2010).
41 HAW. REV. STAT. § 291E-3 (2010); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (West 2010); Wis.
STAT. § 885.235 (2010).
42 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 321J.2 (2010); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-8 (2010).
43 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 46.61.502 (2010) ("Analyses of blood or breath samples
obtained more than two hours after the alleged driving may be used as evidence that within two
hours of the alleged driving, a person had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more .. ).
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test, this initial figure will likely constitute the evidence of intoxication later
used at trial. In the case of a blood test, the figure calculated by the testing la-
boratory will likely need to be subjected to a complex mathematical process of
backward extrapolation to accurately assess intoxication at the time of vehicle
operation." In either scenario, the initial BAC number represents the percen-
tage, by weight, of alcohol in a given volume of blood at the time the test is ad-
ministered.4 5 As mentioned above, blood test cases will often rely upon this
second number extrapolated from the initial results. Ultimately, this extrapo-
lated figure alone-once proven-suffices to create per se criminal liability in
virtually all jurisdictions.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF BODILY INVASIONS AND STATE STATUTORY
RESPONSES
The Fourth Amendment expressly provides for the protection of an in-
dividual's person against unreasonable searches and seizures.46 The fact that the
Fourth Amendment lists the protection of one's person ahead of "houses, pa-
pers, and effects" may be more than mere accident. After all, as the Tenth Cir-
cuit pointedly explained, "[a] person's home is his or her castle, and throughout
history, one of the key purposes of a castle's walls has been to protect the castle-
owner's blood."4 7 Nonetheless, the caselaw governing searches involving the
removal of bodily fluids, or extraction of foreign physical evidence contained
within the body, is governed by a very small universe of Supreme Court deci-
sions. Moreover, the cases in this area, as discussed at length below, set an ex-
ceedingly low standard for most Fourth Amendment intrusions. In response,
many states have undertaken legislative efforts, by promulgating statutes, in
order to strengthen Fourth Amendment protections governing invasive personal
searches. Part II first surveys the watershed cases that makeup the principle
guidance on bodily intrusions, then examines a sampling of the state measures
designed to further limit this type of evidentiary search.
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment ofBodily Intrusions
The Supreme Court's acceptance and limitation of bodily intrusions
ranging from stomach pumping to blood draws to the surgical removal of physi-
cal evidence can be succinctly presented through a quite limited canon of four
landmark cases and a smattering of clarifying decisions. Though the Court has
addressed some of the nuance of certain searches in greater detail, the hallmark
principles guiding bodily searches under the Fourth Amendment are derived
4 For a thorough and detailed discussion of the processes of backward extrapolation in DWI
prosecutions, see Pariser, supra note 5, at 151.
45 STEPHEN BRENT & SHARON STILLER, HANDLING DRUNK DRIVING CASEs 26 (1985).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47 Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg'1 Hosp., 474 F.3d 733, 745 (10th Cir. 2007).
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almost entirely from the decisions in Rochin v. California,4 8 Breithaupt v. Ab-
ram,49 California v. Schmerber,50 and Winston v. Lee.5 Those general parame-
ters have only been reconsidered or adjusted on rare occasion. Though other
cases have touched upon or otherwise considered the issue of bodily intrusion,
this four-case sequence represents the primary foundation upon which DWI
blood draws are permitted and the context in which they are understood. This
sub-section briefly details each of these four watershed cases and a limited se-
lection of other relevant decisions in order to provide greater illustration of the
facts that gave rise to the Court's far reaching conclusions and general under-
standing of the propriety of bodily searches.
1. Rochin v. California
Second in importance only to Schmerber, the Rochin decision marked
the Supreme Court's first modem foray into the relationship between the Consti-
tution and bodily intrusions. More than any of the other cases, Rochin's juri-
sprudential developments reflect the shocking facts of the case. On July 1, 1949,
police, acting on an informant's tip, went to the home of Antonio Rochin to
investigate reports that Rochin had been selling narcotics. 52 Upon entering Ro-
chin's home without a warrant, officers observed Rochin as he quickly swal-
lowed two capsules on his bedside table. The officers rushed to Rochin and
attempted to prevent him from swallowing the capsules, but to no avail.54 In an
effort to recover the now-consumed evidence, the officers took Rochin to the
hospital where doctors inserted a tube into his throat and forced emetic solution
into his stomach.55 This "stomach pumping" caused Rochin to vomit the cap-
sules. It was later proven that the capsules contained morphine, and Rochin
was convicted under a California statute for unlawful possession of a prepara-
tion of morphine.
Addressing the reasonableness of the search of Rochin's stomach, the
Court held that the officers' actions "shocked the conscience" and, hence, the
evidence was inadmissible in state court under the Due Process Clause of the
48 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
49 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
so 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
5 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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Fourteenth Amendment.5 8 In so holding, though, the Court's opinion was abso-
lutely wedded to the specific facts of the search. The Court catalogued injury-
upon-injury perpetrated by the officers as they illegally entered Rochin's home,
physically assaulted him in an effort to prevent him from swallowing the cap-
sules, and caused the forcible extraction of his stomach contacts. 59 Reflecting
upon this particularly egregious chain of conduct, the Court explained that the
officers "methods [were] too close to the rack and the screw to permit of consti-
tutional differentiation."60 In so holding, the Court planted the first jurispruden-
tial flag in the realm of bodily intrusions: the Constitution will not permit the
admission of evidence-even in state court-where that evidence was seized in
a manner that shocks the conscience.
Rochin, of course, no longer represents the governing law in the area of
bodily searches such as those at issue here. As subsequent authority explains,
the combined effect of the decisions in Mapp and Schmerber was to reduce the
standard from the virtually insurmountable "shocks the conscience" standard to
a more attainable "objective reasonableness" test.6 1 Despite this putative shift,
Rochin remains a critical milestone in this area. Though it does not per se pro-
vide the governing standard, the Rochin Court's fact-intensive analytical method
persists and has never been fully supplanted by the factored tests announced in
later cases.6 2 In this way, Rochin lives on and remains a salient consideration in
any bodily seizure scenario.
58 Notably, the language of the Rochin decision addresses the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment rather than, like the remaining cases, the Fourth Amendment. 342 U.S. at 179.
The reason for this slight variation is that the Supreme Court had declined to incorporate the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule at the time. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The
Court subsequently reversed itself in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Since that time, Rochin
has been treated as informing evidentiary non-seizure exclusions post-Mapp in the context of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003)
(applying Rochin to a Fourteenth Amendment exclusion question); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d
559, 599 (2d Cir. 2009) (conducting a mixed Fourth-Fourteenth Amendment analysis relying upon
Rochin); Garner v. Grant, 328 F. App'x 325, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (applying
Rochin); United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (evaluating a compelled
blood draw as a Fourth Amendment claim under Schmerber and as a Fourteenth Amendment
claim under Rochin); Cummings v. McIntire, 271 F.3d 341, 344 (1st Cir. 2001) (distinguishing
Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment cases and applying Rochin); United States v.
Husband, 226 F.3d 626, 630 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
s9 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
60 Id
61 See Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1987).
62 See, e.g., Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring more than mere
allegations of lack of qualification or bald assertion that medical standards were not upheld);
Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (considering a variety of factual circums-
tances including consent to other forms of tests as part of the Schmerber analysis); People v.
Kraft, 84 Cal. Rptr. 280, 284-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (considering all of the contextual facts in
conducting Schmerber analysis against the background of the "Rochin rule"); State v. Ravotto,
777 A.2d 301, 309-10 (N.J. 2001) (emphasizing "shocks the conscience"-like facts including the
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2. Breithaupt v. Abram
Another pre-Mapp case, Breithaupt v. Abram, decided five years after
Rochin, marked the Court's first attempt to assess the boundaries of compelled
blood tests.63 Like in Rochin, the Court's assessment in Breithaupt was limited
to Fourteenth Amendment Due Process concerns.6 Also like in Rochin, the
underlying facts formed the beginning and ending point of the Court's analytical
rubric. Unlike the Rochin decision, however, the reasoning of the Breithaupt
Court's decision has survived intact through the transition from the pre-Mapp
Fourteenth Amendment inquiry to the post-Mapp Fourth Amendment inquiry.
Paul Breithaupt was driving a pickup truck on a New Mexico highway
when his vehicle collided with an oncoming passenger car.6 5 Three occupants
of the car were killed, and Breithaupt was seriously injured.66 A nearly empty
alcohol container was found in the wrecked pickup truck, and alcohol could be
detected on his breath. While in the emergency room for treatment, a state
patrolman requested a blood sample for BAC testing while Breithaupt was still
unconscious from the accident. 6 8 Thus, without Breithaupt's consent, the treat-
ing physician took a blood sample which, after testing, revealed a BAC of 0.17
% alcohol. 69 Based on this evidence, Breithaupt was convicted in a New Mex-
ico state court of involuntary manslaughter.70
Breithaupt challenged his conviction, citing Rochin.n After reciting the
facts of Rochin, the Court concluded that "there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive'
in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case, under the protec-
tive eye of a physician." 7 2 The Court explained that, though a physical invasion
of the body, blood extraction was a commonplace practice undertaken for a
wide variety of reasons in American society.73 Accordingly, "a blood test taken
by a skilled technician [does] not . . . 'shock[] the conscience."' 74 Ultimately,
officers' insistence on a blood test notwithstanding the suspect's paralyzing fear of needles and
willingness to submit to an alternative test).
63 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
6 See supra note 58. Unlike Rochin, Breithaupt has been quite directly folded into the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence post-Mapp. See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir.
2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Kincade, 379
F.3d 813, 836-37 (9th Cir. 2004); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 120 (3d Cir. 2000).






71 Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435.
72 Id. at 435.
n Id. at 436.
74 Id. at 437 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
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the Court concluded that the social value derived in avoiding "[t]he increasing
slaughter on our highways" far outweighed the "slight . . . intrusion as is in-
volved in applying a blood test. 75 As one commentator has pointed out, the
dissent strongly objected to majority's reliance on Rochin's standard.76 Chief
Justice Warren, writing for himself, Justice Black, and Justice Douglas, ex-
plained that the lack of consent, rather than the force used in procuring the evi-
dence, gave rise to the constitutional violation. The dissent explained that
Rochin, like Breithaupt, had not resisted the medical procedure itself.7 8 Accor-
dingly, relying upon the initial violence in Rochin to distinguish subsequent
cases did not make sense, as the violation did not occur until some time later, in
the calmer setting of the hospital.79
Ultimately, Breithaupt served two important purposes in the cases that
followed. First, it represents the first major case justifying a bodily intrusion on
the basis of "the intruder's" professional qualification. Whereas Rochin did not
bother to address the effect of the fact that doctors performed the stomach
pumping, the physician's "protective eye" over the blood draw process appears
to have been an almost dispostive fact in Breithaupt.80 This emphasis on who
draws blood and how it is drawn would become even more important with the
Schmerber decision. Second, Chief Justice Warren's observations, interestingly
enough, portended the difficult question in the caselaw that has followed: what
happens when an individual is unwilling to exacerbate their position by resisting
and only registers their non-consent verbally? This question has yet to be satis-
factorily resolved but frames much of the post-Schmerber precedent of the low-
er courts.
3. Schmerber v. California
More than forty years after it was decided, Schmerber v. Calfornia re-
mains the single leading precedent controlling non-consensual blood draws for
the collection of evidence. Coming fourteen years after Rochin, Schmerber rad-
ically altered the constitutional boundaries of bodily intrusions, and for the first
time applied those boundaries through the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment as incorporated through Mapp v. Ohio.8 1 In so doing, the Court
reduced the prevailing standard while also embracing the preexisting fact-
specific analysis that guided the dispositions of Rochin and Breithaupt. At the
7 Id. at 439.
76 Robert Brooks Beauchamp, Note, Shed Thou No Blood: The Forcible Removable of Blood
Samples from Drunk Driving Suspects, 60 S. CAL. L.REv. 1115, 1123-24 (1987).
7 Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 441 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 436.
81 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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same time, the Court's efforts to tailor its ruling to the facts before it trans-
formed the question of blood draws into an insular area of bodily intrusion juri-
sprudence.
The facts of Schmerber were unremarkable. Armando Schmerber was
hospitalized after an automobile accident.82 Schmerber was formally arrested
while receiving treatment at the hospital. The arresting officer subsequently
instructed the treating physician to take a blood sample to test for BAC.84 On
the strength of the blood evidence, Schmerber was convicted of driving under
the influence.8 5 He appealed, claiming that the admission of the blood evi-
dence-taken without his consent-violated his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure.8 6
The Court immediately dispensed with Schmerber's self-incrimination
claim. Citing Breithaupt, the Court concluded that the information derived from
blood did not constitute testimonial or communicative evidence. According to
the Court, the Fifth Amendment does not protect the body against a search
aimed at discovering evidence. Instead, the privilege against self-incrimination
only reached evidence requiring a defendant to testify against himself as a wit-
ness.88 Ultimately, "[s]ince the blood test evidence, although an incriminating
product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating
to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible
on privilege grounds."8
Acknowledging that it was "writ[ing] on a clean slate" with respect to
bodily intrusion under the Fourth Amendment,90 the Court then turned to
Schmerber's Fourth Amendment issue. The Court conceded that a bodily intru-
sion for the extraction of blood "plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of
a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment."9' First, the Court consi-
dered whether the arresting officer required a warrant to effect the blood draw.
For the first time, the Court resorted to the medical evidence discussed above
regarding absorption and elimination, though in greatly condensed form, to con-
clude that the arresting officer was faced with an emergency situation in which




86 Id at 759.
87 Id at 760 ("Breithaupt summarily rejected an argument that the withdrawal of blood and the
admission of the analysis report involved in that state case violated the Fifth Amendment privilege
of any person . . . .").
88 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761-62.
89 Id at 765.
9 Id. at 768.
91 Id at 767.
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"the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the
destruction of evidence."92 Accordingly, Schmerber essentially created a blan-
ket exigency exception to permit warrantless DWI blood draws.
Second, and more important to this inquiry, the Court addressed the rea-
sonableness of the test chosen to measure the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.
Again citing Breithaupt, the Court reasoned that blood tests represent a com-
monplace event in society involving minimal pain or medical consequence.
The Court intimated that individuals who do not suffer an extreme fear, health
concern, or religious scruple preventing blood draws simply could not complain
of being forced to submit to such a minimally invasive procedure following an
arrest.94 Then the Court, perhaps in dicta or perhaps not, announced what would
become the rule and mark the boundaries for future blood draw assessments:
Petitioner's blood was taken by a physician in a hospital envi-
ronment according to accepted medical practices. We are thus
not presented with the serious questions which would arise if a
search involving use of a medial technique, even of the most
rudimentary sort, were made by other than medical personnel or
in other than a medical environment-for example, if it were
administered by police in the privacy of the stationhouse. To
tolerate searches under these conditions might be to invite an
unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain.95
This concluding paragraph to the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis
marked a major, albeit subtle, sea-change. The Schmerber decision essentially
replaced the "shocks the conscience" fact question with a more manageable
reasonableness test. Moreover, with respect to blood draws, Schmerber ulti-
mately defined the reasonableness inquiry in a strictly elemental fashion-(1)
under what circumstances was the blood drawn, and (2) by whom was it drawn.
As discussed below, the Schmerber two-part test quickly gave rise to
confusion as lower courts began to wrestle with the necessity of both elements
in assessing reasonableness. Nonetheless, Schmerber's two factors persist as
the fundamental issues in blood draw cases and, through Schmerber's progeny,
some other forms of bodily intrusion.96 This effect has only been enhanced by
the Court's dispensing with the warrant requirement. Though state regulation
and lower court precedent have tweaked these principles, Schmerber's funda-
92 Id. at 770 (citations omitted).
SId. at 771.
94 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
9s Id. at 771-72.
96 See Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 490 F.3d 1002, 1009 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying
Schmerber to cavity search); Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2005) (visual
strip search); Sparks v. Stutler, 71 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995) (forced catheterization); United
States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1984) (taking x-ray images).
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mental assertion remains true: warrant or not, non-consensual blood draws will
be assessed on the medical reasonableness of their conduct. They need not
shock the conscience and magistrate approval will not insulate them from inva-
lidation.
4. Winston v. Lee
Though perhaps not as significant as Schmerber, Winston v. Lee
represents the last major bodily intrusion case to issue from the Supreme Court
that is relevant to blood draw jurisprudence. Often overlooked in the scholarly
literature addressing Schmerber, Winston serves to bookend the long and
winding thirty-three year path that began with Rochin by again providing a
quantification of bodily intrusions under the paradigm created by the Schmerber
Court. In so doing, Winston simultaneously extended Schmerber's factored
balancing test while also providing a major outer boundary to the determination
of what can be deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
In the early morning hours of July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson shot an
unidentified, armed man who approached his shop and attempted to rob him at
gunpoint.97 Twenty minutes later, officers found Rudolph Lee eight blocks
away suffering from a gunshot wound to the chest.98 At the hospital, Watkinson
identified Lee as his assailant.99 Before trial, the state moved to compel Lee to
submit to a surgical procedure to remove the bullet from his body for forensic
testing. 00 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after two rounds of motions
and appeals through the state and federal courts attempting to stop the sur-
gery.101
Reconciling Schmerber with the res nova issue of surgical intrusion, the
Court determined that all non-consensual "surgical intrusions beneath the skin
depend[] on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in pri-
vacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the pro-
cedure."l 02 The Court asserted that Schmerber provided the appropriate frame-
work for striking that balance, as it cited to Schmerber's strong emphasis on the
physical medical risk to the individual created by the circumstances of a given
intrusion. 03 In short, surgery, given its highly intrusive nature, requires not
only a heightened satisfaction of the questions "where" and "by whom," but also
a stronger societal interest.
9 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985).
98 Id. at 756.
9 Id
'D Id
101 Id. at 756-58.
102 Id. at 760.
103 Winston, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985).
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While Winston expanded Schmerber's reach to all bodily intrusions, it
also dramatically, though perhaps accidentally, altered Schmerber's test for
blood draws. In many ways, the extensive split on the issue of whether a blood
draw must be assessed in light of the location of seizure and the identity of the
seizing official stems from Winston. Schmerber-with its warning against po-
lice blood draws in the station house-appears to set out a clear minimum stan-
dard; Winston suggests that neither element is necessary so long as medical risk
is accounted for by the entity seeking to compel the bodily intrusion and societal
interests outweigh that risk. As a consequence, Winston's legacy has been the
bifurcation of the lower courts: one group demanding a qualified technician and
reasonableness; the other group requiring a qualified technician and a medical
environment to overcome per se unreasonableness. This result has not only
produced inconsistency between jurisdictions but, perhaps more importantly, a
degree of unpredictability in those jurisdictions declining to inquire into both the
location and agent of a challenged compelled blood-draw.'0
5. Miscellaneous Decisions
Two other Supreme Court cases following Schmerber deserve brief
consideration before turning to the state responses to the Court's jurisprudential
developments. Both Welsh v. Wisconsin'05 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Ex-
ecutives Ass'n 0 6 accept as given Schmerber's permissive acceptance of blood
draws and go further to consider the circumstances under which such a seizure
is permissible absent a warrant. Though not obviously necessary to a considera-
tion of the post- Winston version of Schmerber's test, Welsh and Skinner mark
important developments in the warrant requirement so easily dismissed in the
Schmerber opinion-again emphasizing the case-by-case approach necessary to
evaluating bodily intrusion seizures.
In Welsh, police, acting without a warrant, raided the home of Edward
Welsh to arrest him on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. 07 After being
taken to the station, Welsh refused to submit to any form of BAC testing. 0 8 The
state subsequently attempted to admit Welsh's refusal into evidence, notwith-
standing the fact that his presence at that police station had been procured by a
warrantless arrest in his home. 0 9 T he Welsh Court rejected the state's argument
that entry into the home was justified by the exigent circumstance that the alco-
104 See Jay A. Gitles, Fourth Amendment-Reasonableness of Surgical Intrusions: Winston v.
Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985), 76 J. CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 972, 981 (1985) (discussing the pit-
falls of the "flexibility" added to the Schmerber test via Winston).
1os 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
'0 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
107 Welsh, 446 U.S. at 743.
108 Id.
'09 Id. at 746-47.
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hol in Welsh's blood was being eliminated with each passing minute.1 10 In so
doing, Welsh added two qualifications to Schmerber. First, the excuse from
getting a warrant to draw blood did not extend so far as to create an exigency
justifying an in-home warrantless arrest."' Second, and more importantly, the
Welsh Court considered the severity of the particular crime charged as another
factor in assessing reasonableness " 2-adding yet another layer to Schmerber
analysis.
Five years later, the Supreme Court relaxed its holding in Welsh, albeit
indirectly, via the decision in Skinner. In Skinner, the Court considered the con-
stitutionality of several federal regulations requiring railroad employers to con-
duct BAC and drug tests following accidents.1 3 The Court held that suspicion-
less, warrantless blood testing that otherwise comported with Schmerber did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because of the "special needs" beyond law en-
forcement at stake.114 More than just an expansion of "special needs" jurispru-
dence, Skinner reinforced the sense from Welsh that the propriety of a blood
draw seizure depends both on the circumstances of the seizure and the specific
importance of the interest-often in terms of the severity of the crime to be
charged-advanced by the blood evidence.
Together, Welsh and Skinner resolved much of the lingering uncertainty
about when a compelled blood draw can be carried out, particularly without a
warrant. Ultimately though, neither decision, and no decision since, has clari-
fied the requirements of Schmerber beyond the limited guidance added by Wins-
ton in 1985. Courts addressing this issue since that time have been left to strug-
gle with more questions than answers and, ultimately, only two enduring in-
structions: (1) bodily intrusions must be reasonable under the circumstances of a
given case and (2) reasonableness will be assessed in whole or in part based
upon the identity of the individual who extracts the bodily evidence and where
the extraction occurs.
B. A Sampling of State Responses to the Supreme Court's Permissive
Fourth Amendment Rules
The Supreme Court's largely pro-search jurisprudence in the area of
compelled blood draws has provoked a wide variety of statutory responses
around the country. For the most part, states have opted for a more restrictive
approach and have limited the circumstances and conditions of this form of sei-
zure. More specifically, state efforts in response to the Schmerber approach to
seizures by bodily intrusion have resulted in three major statutory reactions: 1)
"0 Id. at 753.
I' Id.
112 Id. (placing emphasis on the "gravity of the underlying offense").
113 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
114 Id. at 620, 634.
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restrictions on the use of force; 2) limitations on who may conduct a compelled
blood draw; and 3) miscellaneous constraints affecting everything from the lo-
cation of blood draws to the necessity of a warrant. The ultimate consequence
of these state regulations has been to greatly limit, if not foreclose, the universe
of compelled blood draws in a great many jurisdictions.
1. Restrictions on the Use of Force
Though many states have altered the Schmerber test by statute, many
more have opted to address the even more fundamental question of whether they
want to conduct compelled blood draws at all. Rather than parsing who can
draw blood and where it may be drawn, numerous jurisdictions have addressed
the blood draw question in terms of use of force, and the response is both varied
and striking. Specifically, states have largely responded in one of four ways.
First, some states have simply adopted Schmerber in total and simply codified
the right of the state to use force to conduct a non-consensual blood draw." 5 At
the other extreme, a number of states have adopted an absolute right to refuse. 16
Rather than compel searches, these states frequently criminalize refusal itself
and/or permit the introduction of a refusal as evidence. The third statutory re-
sponse seeks to achieve a middle ground by only permitting compelled draws
under particularly severe circumstances. Nevada, for instance, limits compelled
draws to cases involving death, serious bodily injury, or a repeat offender.117
Numerous other states have adopted similar measures, though often varying as
to the specific circumstances allowing a forcible extraction. 118 Finally, a small
number of jurisdictions require police to advise a suspect that reasonable force
will be used if they refuse to comply but otherwise impose no additional restric-
tions.119
2. Identity Limitations
Responding to Schmerber's "police officers drawing blood" hypotheti-
cal, the second major area of state regulation has addressed who may conduct a
compulsory blood draw. Virtually every jurisdiction permitting compelled
115 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.035 (2010) (permitting non-consensual seizures without
added qualification).
116 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-67.1 (2010) (barring non-consensual tests); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 189A.105 (LexisNexis 2010) (implicitly barring non-consensual draws by codifying a
refusal right); Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.041 (2010) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (2010)
(same); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (West 2008) (same).
117 NEV. REv. STAT. § 484C.160 (2010).
uS See FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (2010) (requiring serious bodily injury or death); MD. CODE
ANN., TRANSP. § 16-205.1 (LexisNexis 2010) (same); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (Consol.
2010) (same); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 291E-21 (2009) (requiring any physical injury as a
result of the charged offense).
119 See, e.g., OHio REv. CODEANN. § 4511.191 (LexisNexis 2010).
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draws maintains a codified statutory list of who may actually execute such a
seizure. The extent of those lists, however, varies widely. Florida, for example,
permits blood to be drawn by "a physician, certified paramedic, registered
nurse, licensed practical nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw
blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or
technician."1 20 Most states permitting compelled draws have adopted a list like
that used in Florida with small alterations. 121 Maryland has taken a different
tack and, instead, merely mandates all blood draws be conducted by a "qualified
medical person" rather than providing a list of who qualifies.12 2 Nevada pro-
vides the most direct response to Schmerber by specifically excluding a specific
party from drawing blood regardless of qualification-the arresting officer.123
Nevada also takes the unique approach of allowing any person with "special
knowledge" falling outside its otherwise exclusive list to qualify as an accepta-
ble seizing individual.12 4 The question of identity addressed in these statutes
represents the primary area of post-Schmerber regulation designed both to pro-
tect citizens' right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the integrity of
DWI evidence.
3. Miscellaneous Protections
Several states have also introduced innovative responses to Schmerber
in a number of other ways. California only allows certified technicians to con-
duct compelled blood draws in jails and other police settings. 125 Kentucky, Ari-
zona, and New York require an arresting officer to secure a warrant or court
order before conducting a compelled blood draw.12 6 Nevada specifically prohi-
bits the use of compelled blood draws when the suspect is a hemophiliac or
takes anticoagulant medications. 12 7 South Dakota gives suspects an absolute
right to refuse but only if they properly invoke the statutory provision.' 28
These unusually strong and widely varied statutory responses demon-
strate more than the general state of the law on compelled blood draws. They
reflect the fine line between social necessity and personal privacy tread by states
seeking to discourage DWI offenses and related crimes. Moreover, they suggest
120 FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (2010).
121 See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1388 (2010); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23158 (Deering
2009); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (Consol. 2010) (codifying a similar list but requiring phy-
sician supervision).
122 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-304 (LexisNexis 2006).
123 NEV. REV. STAT. § 484C.250 (2010).
124 Id
125 CAL. VEH. CODE § 23158 (Deering 2009).
126 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1321 (2010); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.105 (LexisNexis
2010); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (Consol. 2010).
127 NEV. REV. STAT. § 484C.160 (2010).
128 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-13 (2009).
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a certain reservation and wariness to invade the human body notwithstanding
the blessing of the Schmerber Court. These attempts at local regulation have, in
many ways, had an equal if not more formative effect on the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence of blood draws than much of the caselaw in this area.
III. THE DIVERGENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SCHMERBER ANALYSIS
The state-driven effort to create additional protections beyond Schmer-
ber has ultimately produced a split in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Though the statutory requirements discussed supra theoretically only create a
statutory remedy, state courts have frequently imported their state's unique ap-
proach to compelled blood draws into their Schmerber reasonableness analysis.
Born also from Schmerber Court's troubled reservation of judgment as to draws
"administered by police in the privacy of the stationhouse,"l 29 the result has
been a bifurcation of states that permit compelled draws into two large catego-
ries: 1) states requiring a trained medical technician in a medical environment
and 2) states requiring only a trained medical technician. Where a state falls in
this split directly controls the policies and procedures used to secure DWI blood
samples in a given jurisdiction. Though courts have treated both approaches as
equally reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous test, only one understanding
of Schmerber is correct-the Fourth Amendment test announced in Schmerber
creates a per se requirement for medical technicians and all other considerations
are merely weights on the scale of reasonableness.
A. The Federal Courts ofAppeals and Schmerber
The federal courts of appeals have had only a handful of occasions to
meaningfully address the Supreme Court's approach to compelled blood draws.
DWI is primarily and overwhelmingly a state crime, and most federal interac-
tion with Schmerber has arisen from either far more serious crimes or congres-
sional statutory mandates. As such, the federal courts have rarely faced the hard
Schmerber balancing question pitting simple DWI against the right to personal
privacy and bodily integrity. Where federal courts have addressed Schmerber,
their view has been uniformly dismissive. Every single circuit to address this
issue has adopted some form of Briethaupt's position that blood draws are
commonplace and represent a de minimis invasion of personal privacy. 130 The
Eleventh Circuit has held that strip searches involve a greater personal indignity
129 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
130 See United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d
421, 427 (6th Cir. 2008); Amerson, 483 F.3d at 84; Zimmerman, 514 F.3d at 855; United States v.
Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir.
2006); Johnson, 440 F.3d at 496; United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005);
Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171,
176 (5th Cir. 1995); Jones, 962 F.2d at 310; Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1347.
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and Fourth Amendment concern than blood draws.' 3 As it applies to Schmer-
ber analysis, the Ninth Circuit, in at least one case, has upheld the admission of
blood draw evidence secured by an unqualified individual and has intimated that
lack of qualification alone-failing the more relaxed "Single Element" test dis-
cussed below-is not enough to create a constitutional violation. 132 On occa-
sion, a handful of courts have given greater weight to blood draw claims.'33 But
these decisions represent an exception to the general implicit rule that Schmer-
ber all but requires the same "shocks-the-conscience" level of indignity dis-
cussed in Rochin if a blood draw is to rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment
violation. Nonetheless, the small number of federal cases combined with the
primary application in the state courts has resulted in the federal courts of ap-
peals wielding little influence in the development of blood draw jurisprudence.
B. The Two Element Approach
A significant number, albeit a minority, of the roughly sixteen states to
address Schmerber's analytical framework have opted for something looking
like a two-factor per se reasonableness test. Rather than explore the murky wa-
ters of "reasonableness," these states have built their judicial understanding of
Schmerber from the Supreme Court's instruction that taking blood by way of a
physician in a hospital according to accepted medical practices constitutes a
reasonable seizure. More precisely, they have taken this instruction along with
the Court's concerns regarding police blood draws in the station house to mean
that the Fourth Amendment affirmatively requires both a medical technician and
a medical environment. All other circumstances, these courts reason, run afoul
of Schmerber's constitutional boundary. Ultimately, the "two elements" at issue
here represent a Fourth Amendment floor-a draw by a qualified person in an
acceptable environment is not a free pass, but failure to meet either of these re-
quirements is an automatic fail.
New Jersey is the leading proponent of the "two element" approach. As
early as 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Dyal noted in dicta that
the Fourth Amendment required compulsory blood draws to be conducted "at a
131 Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1297 (1Ith Cir. 2005).
132 See, e.g., Revelles v. Stout, 103 F. App'x 622, 626-27 (9th Cir. 2004); Ove v. Gwinn, 264
F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001) (allegations that technicians were "untrained" or "unqualified"
deemed insufficient).
" United States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing compelled blood draws
as a serious intrusion); Richmond, 490 F.3d at 1009 (describing the threat posed by non-medical
personnel conducting blood draws); Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg'I Hosp., 474 F.3d 733 (10th
Cir. 2007) (affirming civil verdict against police officers for non-consensual blood draw on mis-
demeanor charge); Martin v. Red Lion Police Dep't, 146 Fed. App'x. 558 (3d Cir. 2005) (broadly
considering a blood draw under a holistic reasonableness approach); Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143
F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
limits of reasonable force).
[Vol. 113404
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss2/6
IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE (STATION) HOUSE?
hospital or other suitable health care facility." 34 Ten years later, another New
Jersey court, citing Dyal, concluded that both the identity of the individual con-
ducting the blood draw and the location of the blood draw represent the neces-
sary inquiries under Schmerber.135 Though New Jersey's caselaw reveals occa-
sional variation before the Dyal decision issued, 136 this emphasis on these two
key circumstances of the blood draw appears to control in the majority of deci-
sions.137
Several other states have followed New Jersey's lead. In both State v.
Diaz'3 8 and State v. DeWitt,'39 the Idaho courts recently reaffirmed their empha-
sis on identity and location when they recited facts regarding both elements in
affirming the admission of blood draw evidence. In Ohio, a state intermediate
court concluded that procedures were medically reasonable notwithstanding the
fact that the suspect suffered extensive bruising from an inexpert blood draw
because the draw was performed "by a qualified medical technician in a hospital
setting."1 4 0 In Texas, the Johnston case is not the only decision to conclude that
location represents a key component of the Schmerber calculus. In Burns v.
State, a Texas court concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that officers used
force to restrain the suspect, the blood draw was reasonable because it was con-
ducted "in a medically acceptable manner by a hospital laboratory technician in
the hospital."'41
Though only a small number of jurisdictions, these states impose an im-
portant Fourth Amendment minimum directly shaping the means and methods
of conducting compelled blood draws in their territories. To be assured of ad-
mission, blood evidence may not be taken in the jailhouse, booking room, or
sally port. Often times, officers will have to choose between going straight to
the station or straight to the hospital to preserve rapidly depleting evidence. At
the same time, as evidenced by the Sisler decision out of Ohio, the use of a solid
two element standard can be misconstrued to excuse even flagrant violations
where the naked "elements" have been satisfied-even where a more holistic
approach would otherwise show the exact same conduct to be medically unac-
134 478 A.2d 390, 395 (N.J. 1984) (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72).
13s State v. Warmbrun, 648 A.2d 1153, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
136 See State v. McMaster, 288 A.2d 583, 584 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (upholding a
blood draw by an arguably unqualified individual in a proper environment approximately twelve
years before the Dyal decision).
137 See, e.g., State v. Ravotto, 777 A.2d 301 (N.J. 2001); State v. Woomer, 483 A.2d 837, 838
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
138 160 P.3d 739, 742 (Idaho 2007).
139 184 P.3d 215, 219-20 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008).
14 State v. Sisler, 683 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ohio Ct. App.1995).
141 Bums v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. App. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by
Nguyen v. State, 292 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
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ceptable.14 2 This inherent flaw calls into question the value of any added protec-
tion afforded by imposing a location requirement.
C. The Single Element Approach
The majority of states to take on Schmerber have read the discussion of
hospitals-and-physicians versus station houses-and-officers as a guideline rather
than a steadfast rule. These "single element" jurisdictions all share two charac-
teristics in their understanding of the appropriate Fourth Amendment analysis of
blood draws. First, all of these courts, though in varying degree, place signifi-
cant emphasis on who conducts a compelled blood draw. Second, while the
identity element can have dispositive effect, most of the "single element" juris-
dictions constantly emphasize that they review the totality of the circumstances
to assess reasonableness. This take on Schmerber usually results in a more
permissive view of compelled blood draws but can, on occasion, invalidate un-
reasonable seizures that would pass muster under the stricter two element re-
gimes.
The single element jurisdictions largely coalesce into two distinct
groups: 1) pure totality and 2) identity-emphasizing. The smaller pure totality
group of states includes only California and, perhaps, New Mexico.14 3 Under
this approach, location is virtually irrelevant and identity, while important, is not
always dispositive. Case-in-point, the California Court of Appeals in People v.
Mateljan held that a compelled blood draw by an individual falling outside of
the state list of qualified medical technicians did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.'" The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding an offer of testimo-
ny suggesting that blood draws by the individuals with training like that of the
technician at issue fell below medically acceptable standards. The Matejlan
court nonetheless affirmed the draw citing the fact that the record did not dem-
onstrate that the blood draw was unsanitary or that it resulted in unusual pain or
indignity.145 This refusal to find a Fourth Amendment violation on the basis of
142 Sisler, 683 N.E.2d at 109 (simultaneously finding a blood draw medically acceptable under
the Fourth Amendment and shocking to the conscience per Rochin and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
143 See State v. Trujillo, 510 P.2d 1079, 1083 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (use of unlicensed technol-
ogist satisfied statute and Fourth Amendment under the circumstances); State v. Wiberg, 754 P.2d
529, 531 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Santillanes, 998 P.2d 1203
(N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (use of unlicensed nurse satisfied statute and Fourth Amendment under the
circumstances), as recognized in State v. Nez, No. 26,811, 2009 N.M. App. LEXIS 234, at *3-4
(N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2009).
144 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
145 Id. at 511 ("Moreover, in light of the expert testimony presented by the city and county, the
trial court could conclude that the draws were performed in a manner which did not create undue
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identity absent more runs consistently through the California caselawl 46 and was
perhaps stated best in People v. Sugarman: "Those who draw blood need not be
doctors, but they may not expose the defendant to an unreasonable risk of infec-
tion or pain."1 47 This approach to Schmerber appears to treat the discussion of
medical standards, identity, and location as dicta useful as little more than ab-
stract guidance.
Identity-emphasizing jurisdictions take a slightly different approach.
These courts view the identity of the individual drawing the blood as a neces-
sary aspect of ascertaining whether a compelled draw was conducted under
medically acceptable conditions. The reasoning behind this approach is simple.
For these courts, the heart of Schmerber analysis is assessing the risk of harm
posed to the suspect. As one South Dakota court stated the issue, the Fourth
Amendment inquiry boils down to determining "the extent to which the proce-
dure may threaten the safety or health of the individual" and little more.148 Al-
though allowing an unqualified individual to conduct a blood draw presents
obvious risks (and limited utility), the risk of a qualified individual conducting a
blood draw in a non-medical environment is less obvious.149 In other words, a
judicial inquiry into the risk of specific pain and indignity posed by the perfor-
mance of a blood draw by a non-medically qualified individual presents a suffi-
ciently obvious problem to permit a per se rule. As such, though these jurisdic-
tions devote a great deal of effort to assessing the totality of the circumstances
in each given case, they also emphasize that the identity of the individual per-
forming the actual mechanical task of extracting the blood serves as a founda-
tional question and frequent first stop in Schmerber analysis.
D. Choosing the Best Interpretation of Schmerber
Given these varying approaches to Schmerber, which approach is best?
The Supreme Court has yet to intervene and resolve this simmering dispute be-
tween the various inconsistent state court positions. That silence, though, in-
14 See People v. Esayian, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); People v. McHugh, 14
Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 149-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (use of unlicensed phlebotomist deemed reasona-
ble); but see Ross v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 268 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (sus-
pects are "entitled to assurances" that the individual conducting the blood draw is "a person quali-
fied by statute to draw blood in a proper manner"); People v. Kraft, 84 Cal. Rptr. 280, 284-85
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (extreme use of force to secure sample sufficient to render seizure less than
medically acceptable).
147 People v. Sugarman, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
148 State v. Sickler, 488 N.W.2d 70, 73 (S.D. 1992); see also State v. Lanier, 452 N.W.2d 144,
146 (S.D. 1990) ("We interpret Schmerber and its progeny to hold that blood tests are not required
to take place in a hospital but rather under conditions which provide a medically approved manner
for the specific purpose of drawing blood.").
149 See generally State v. Cardona, 2008 Del. Super. LEXIS 414, at *32-34 (Del. Super. Ct.
Dec. 3, 2008) (expressly rejecting the argument that a medical environment necessarily presents
the same inherent risk of unnecessary pain or indignity as the use of an unqualified technician).
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forms which option represents the best approach to applying the Fourth
Amendment context. Schmerber should be interpreted as requiring a holistic
analysis of the reasonableness of a given blood draw with near, but not absolute,
invalidation applied whenever a seizure is conducted by an unqualified individ-
ual. This approach represents the least-restrictive commonly held standard, and
it strikes the proper balance between the successful procurement of necessary
evidence and the need to preserve privacy and personal dignity.
The logical problems with the strict two-element approach are apparent.
A Wisconsin court explained the decision to largely ignore location thusly: "Al-
though Schmerber urged caution, it did not categorically reject the possibility
that a blood draw could take place in a non-medical setting."15 0 Not only did the
Supreme Court decline to create a categorical bar, such a bar simply would not
make sense. As the same Wisconsin court went on to note, the assumption that
conducting blood draws in a jailhouse facility automatically creates a greater
risk of injury or infection lacks factual support.15  Obviously, a particularly
dangerous non-medical environment might suffice to create a Fourth Amend-
ment violation. In reality, though, the station house environment could conceiv-
ably be safer than a medical environment. After all, jails are better equipped to
require unruly, intoxicated individuals to do things they simply do not want to
do. Whereas a typical emergency room is heavy laden with hazards, the austeri-
ty of a properly selected holding environment eliminates a certain risk. Accor-
dingly, the emphasis placed on environment by states like New Jersey and Idaho
looks more like blind adherence to a misread Supreme Court opinion rather than
reasoned imposition of Fourth Amendment safeguards.
At the same time, California's completely open-ended approach and
willingness to tolerate blood draws by entirely unqualified individuals appears
to overreach the bounds of Schmerber. The California cases universally miss a
key aspect of Schmerber. The Schmerber Court was focused on the risk of
harm-not only the realization of that risk.152 In each of the California cases
tolerating unqualified agents, except for the Sugarman decision, the courts have
consistently cited the lack of realized serious harm as a justification for approv-
ing the seizure. 53 This sort of ex post facto analysis is inevitable if identity is
not afforded proper weight, and it runs afoul of Schmerber.
Ultimately, the identity-heavy approach used by the other single ele-
ment jurisdictions best conforms to Schmerber's somewhat amorphous stan-
dards. Though these courts need not impose a per se invalidation based on iden-
tity, their inclination to do so has worked to keep the issue of risk out in front.
150 State v. Daggett, 640 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
Is1 See id. at 550-51.
152 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772 (warning against seizures that "invite an unjustified element of
personal risk of infection and pain").
1 See People v. Mateljan, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); People v. Esayian, 5
Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People v. McHugh, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 149-50
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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At the same time, their refusal to blindly adhere to a two-factor test has helped
avoid situations like that in State v. Ravotto, in which lower courts looked past
egregious government conduct because it occurred at the hands of a physician in
a medical environment. 154 Under such a system, lower courts are encouraged to
ignore even glaring unreasonableness to focus exclusively on two discrete inqui-
ries and, in the case of Ravotto, only the state Supreme Court was able to get
past this mechanical approach to reach the readily apparent, commonsense re-
sult. 55 Though the question of what municipalities should do as a matter of
policy may demand a higher standard, this identity-heavy, totality review best
conforms to the minimum constitutional requirements set out by the Supreme
Court nearly half a century ago.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS GUIDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SCHMERBER
COMPLIANT BLOOD DRAW PROGRAM
The suggestion that an identity-heavy, totality approach is the best read-
ing of Schmerber does not mean that it necessarily represents a good target for
the purpose of policy-setting. As demonstrated in the Johnston case, conducting
compelled blood draws outside a medical setting or with minimally qualified
individuals carries with it certain risks left uncontained by meeting the mini-
mum constitutional standards. Though the list of potential consequences is li-
mitless, the caselaw and statutory guidance discussed above evinces three pri-
mary concerns: 1) the procurement of usable evidence; 2) the avoidance of con-
stitutional invalidation; and 3) the risk of unique tort harms. These three issues
and a smattering of smaller matters inform, although inconsistently and incom-
pletely, the full array of statutory rules and state judicial decisions.
A. The Evidentiary Concern
The first and most significant policy concern underpinning compulsory
blood draw guidelines has nothing to do with liability. Instead, the first priority
must be the acquisition of reliable, admissible evidence in determining when,
where, and how to draw blood. More precisely, the purpose of a compelled
blood draw is to get an accurate BAC reading. Setting aside the question of
judicial suppression, the initial and overriding goal of any compelled blood
draw program should be to secure the best blood sample possible in order to
most effectively assess a suspect's offense conduct. The numerous state regula-
tions discussed supra generally support this policy goal in varying degrees. For
instance, the identity requirement itself not only lends expertise to the procedure
154 State v. Ravotto, 777 A.2d 301 (N.J. 2001) (reversing State v. Ravotto, 755 A.2d 602 (N.J.
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but often interjects a third party not involved in the arrest-thus better insulating
the resulting evidence from charges of fabrication.156
Moreover, the presentation of BAC evidence derived from a sample of-
ten taken more than an hour after driving presents basic jury acceptance is-
sues.157 As one commentator has noted, "there remains the nagging feeling that
the removal of blood from within the body of the accused by means of force in
[a] . . . routine drunk driving case shocks the conscience, as in Rochin."'5 8
Though that view has not been born out across the board, it remains an ever-
present concern in structuring blood draw programs. The decision in some ju-
risdictions to conduct compelled draws in a medical setting with individuals
easily identified as medical personnel appears likely to further enhance the value
of BAC evidence by reducing it to a purely scientific inquiry divorced from the
emotion of the arrest and booking process. In short, the goal of conducting a
forced blood draw is to produce evidence that is not only admissible but that
will effectively persuade a jury. By imposing added protections, a jurisdiction
can advance that end and, thereby, better serve the social concerns justifying
this invasion of bodily integrity in the first place.
B. Avoiding Constitutional Invalidation
Assuming the BAC evidence gathered by force is persuasive to a jury,
the next concern is persuading the courts to admit it as a matter of constitutional
law. Though constitutional or statutory liability may pose a small concern, the
overwhelming majority of state cases already surveyed do not concern either
statutory or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. Instead, Schmerber is a case designed to
guide lower courts in making suppression decisions. Read in this way, Schmer-
ber provides the clearest and best endorsement for adopting elevated compelled
blood draw standards. The Schmerber Court provided two factual scenarios: 1)
a doctor in a medical facility, and 2) a police officer in the station house. 59 The
Court enthusiastically endorsed the former with almost dismissive ease and as-
sertions that blood draws represent a de minimis concern. 16 0 That tone changed
rather starkly when the Court turned to the "officer at the stationhouse" hypo-
thetical. Though the Court did not expressly address it, the tone of Schmerber
156 This benefit is particularly apparent in the case of the Nevada statute. Under Nevada Re-
vised Statute § 484C.250, an arresting officer may not conduct the blood draw. This forced inter-
jection of a third party provides the state with a potential testifying witness who was not involved
in the arrest process in every case.
1s7 For a discussion of the complexities and variables frequently presented to juries considering
DWI charges based on BAC calculations, see J. Nicholas Bostic, Alcohol-Related Offenses: Re-
trograde Extrapolation After Wager, MICH. B.J., Jun. 2000, available at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfm?articlelD=83&volumelD=8.
' Beauchamp, supra note 76, at 1135.
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made apparent that such a scenario would have been virtually guaranteed to be
invalidated.'6 1 As the previous section makes clear, numerous courts have spent
the last four decades charting a middle ground between these two scenarios.' 62
As some, like California, creep ever closer to the lower boundary, however, they
risk the validity of the most valuable and necessary piece of evidence underly-
ing their ability to secure DWI convictions for the benefit of the public.163
C. The Egg-Shell Plaintiff and Johnston's Warning
The Johnston case that began this inquiry also provides insight into a
policy concern governing the mechanical implementation of a blood draw pro-
gram in light of constitutional boundaries. Much of the decision to invalidate
the blood draw in Johnston turned on the failure of the officers conducting the
draw to solicit a medical history from the suspect before conducting the medical
procedure of extracting blood.6' What sorts of risks perpetuated by the simple
failure to take a medical history may have caused the court's concern? The an-
swer again lies in the Nevada statute governing compelled blood draws. Nevada
expressly forbids the use of compelled blood draw in cases involving hemophi-
liacs or individuals taking anti-coagulant medications.165 Unfortunately, thus
far, only this single statute has recognized the Johnston problem: any given sus-
pect subjected to a compelled blood draw could be the egg-shell plaintiff severe-
ly harmed by an otherwise safe procedure.
In formulating policy, policy-makers must consider the likelihood that
requiring lesser qualifications might result in a missed warning sign or, more
likely, a complete failure to look for warning signs in the first place. Similarly,
conducting draws in the station house tends to obscure the fact that a blood
draw, however simple, is a medical procedure requiring extreme care and atten-
tion to detail. The enormous and easily avoidable liability exposure created by,
as in Johnston, having an otherwise properly trained officer conduct a blood
draw and consequently forget something as small as asking a few simple ques-
tions to identify particularly vulnerable individuals militates in favor of a more
structured methodology removed from the process, location, and emotion of
booking suspects.
161 Id.
162 See supra Part II.B and Part III.
163 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Wilins, Do I Really Have a Choice? Compulsory Blood Tests on Drunk
Drivers and the Fourth Amendment, 25 W. ST. U.L. REV. 43 (1997) (discussing, for example,
California's move towards compelled blood tests where a suspect would submit to another test as
an example of the increasingly questionable use of forcibly obtained blood draws).
' State v. Johnston, 305 S.W.3d 746, 75941 (Tex. App. 2009).
165 NEV. REV. STAT. § 484C.160 (2010).
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D. Other Risks Informing Blood Draw Planning
Numerous other risks inform the policy choices driving the precise me-
chanics of compelled blood draws around the country. For example, the differ-
ent approaches to conducting compelled blood draws carry with them differing
degrees of risk for the officers and other participants involved. Policy-makers
must determine whether the threat to non-law enforcement participants and bys-
tanders in a hospital environment outweighs the risk posed to multi-tasking of-
ficers attempting to maintain order while conducting a "medically acceptable"
blood draw in the environs of a station house. In another example, as public
fervor for DWI prosecutions waxes and wanes, policy-makers must consider the
public perception of excess and punitive intent in the act of forcibly restraining
an intoxicated individual and extracting blood. In the heat of conducting an
arrest and investigation, the force used-however necessary-could easily be
perceived as vindictive and undermine police efficacy on a broader scale in the
community.
As always, no single policy appears likely to address all of these con-
cerns. In fact, a policy-maker likely should not spend a particularly significant
amount of time on some them. Nonetheless, a policy-maker must consider the
disparity between the courtroom where suppression is considered and the police
cruisers, station houses, and emergency rooms where the mechanics of these
programs are implemented. While litigation reduces the Schmerber question to
an isolated, fact-intensive inquiry, the process of securing BAC measurements
from unwilling suspects occurs in high volume and requires fluid consistency to
remain effective. As such, each of these potential issues stemming from the
way in which compelled blood draws are conducted demonstrates the need to
look past the constitutional floor set by Schmerber and even the heightened sta-
tutory protections mandated by certain states to achieve the most balanced, ef-
fective seizure policy possible.
V. THE BETTER BLOOD DRAW: A POLICY PROPOSAL FOR BALANCING LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND FOURTH AMENDMENT NEEDS
Commentators have long suggested alternatives that would completely
supplant the compelled blood draw.166 The statutes and caselaw from every
court surveyed reveal that states are simply unwilling to adopt these alternatives
as wholesale replacements for their Schmerber-driven programs. Left only with
the compelled blood draw, then, an ounce of prevention, as the saying goes, is
worth a pound of cure. Most of the existing statutory schemes ignore this sage
advice in a variety of ways. New Jersey and the other two-element states puta-
tively seek to prevent constitutional violations, but do so in a way that can blind
' See Beauchamp, supra note 76, at 1136-40; Wilins, supra note 163, at 61-62.
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them to common-sense violations.'67 California's open-ended approach utterly
abandons prevention in favor of flexibility and strips away all predictability.16 8
Finally, most of the one-element states simply stop short of fully addressing the
Fourth Amendment concerns at stake. Ultimately, the model blood draw
process derives largely from the Nevada standards. Adjusted to better address
the question of location, Nevada's heavy emphasis on the ends of Schmerber
makes it the ideal springboard for crafting a policy that properly balances social
necessity, Fourth Amendment rights, and the variety of policy concerns pre-
viously discussed. Building off of the Nevada standard, an ideal policy must
address and accommodate three issues: 1) the question of identity; 2) the ques-
tion of location; 3) the need to easily dispose of frivolous litigation.
First, the question of identity must be given greater priority. Unlike
most current regimes, policy-makers must begin to take identity seriously rather
than merely dismissing it, like so many reviewing state courts and state legisla-
tures. The wide-open, permissive nature of many of the existing schemes
should be abandoned in favor of a concrete, list-based standard of medical pro-
fessionals easily identified by officer and suspect alike. Statutes like the one
employed in Arizona that refuse to make identity an evidentiary foundation pay
lip-service to Schmerber at their own peril.16 9 The quality of BAC evidence
depends upon how it was procured, and the question of who drew tested blood
will continue to sit at the heart of that inquiry. Additionally, as required in Ne-
vada, arresting officers should be prohibited from conducting blood draws on
their own suspects regardless of their qualification. Further still, uniformed
police officers in general should not be permitted to conduct the draws. Such a
policy would eliminate the appearance of collusion and bullying apparent in
cases like Johnston.17 0 Such a rule does not mean the person conducting the
blood draw may not be an employee of the police department. Instead, the indi-
vidual tasked with extracting blood from unwilling DWI suspects should be
someone not otherwise or typically involved in the process of conducting ar-
rests, and, preferably, someone serving the police in a medical capacity. By
relying on jailhouse nurses rather than uniformed officers, policy-makers can
167 See State v. Ravotto, 755 A.2d 602 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that non-
consensual blood draw of suspect exhibiting a hysterical response to needles and offering to take
other tests did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the blood draw occurred in a hospital
setting and was conducted by a medical technician), rev'd, 777 A.2d 301 (N.J. 2001).
168 As an example, California is the only state to repeatedly litigate the boundaries of medical
qualification. See People v. Mateljan, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); People v.
Esayian, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People v. McHugh, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142,
149-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); People v. Ford, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189, 190-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
169 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1388 (2010).
170 See State v. Johnston, 305 S.W.3d 746, 759-61 (Tex. App. 2009) (taking a skeptical view of
forcible extraction by two officers notwithstanding their training because of the decidedly non-
medical circumstance of submitting to a blood draw by two police officers in a station house
without a medical technician present).
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help defuse an otherwise volatile situation, protect officer safety, encourage
cooperation, and produce evidence that will appear less unsavory.
Second, blood draws should be conducted in designated medical loca-
tions. Such a requirement does not mean blood draws can only be conducted in
hospitals. On the contrary, hospitals do not appear to present a better environ-
ment than station houses for this sort of police activity. Taking drunken, resis-
tant suspects to busy, hazard strewn hospitals appears to create unnecessary
risks while adding little to Fourth Amendment protections. At the same time,
the austere environs of a police station sally port or holding cell unnecessarily
add to the "personal indignity" underpinning so much of the Supreme Court's
bodily intrusion jurisprudence. Police stations desiring to conduct in-house
draws should designate and prepare sterile medical spaces, or use existing space
of this sort to seize blood evidence. Such an approach will reduce the risks in-
herent to traveling to emergency rooms and exposing hospital employees and
patients to intoxicated suspects. More importantly, though, the use of a desig-
nated medical space will help control the use of force and other surrounding
circumstances that so often invalidate blood seizures by simply reminding offic-
ers and technicians that they are participating in a medical procedure.
Third, as is increasingly true in all use of force cases, police should vi-
deotape the process of conducting a compelled blood draw, regardless of the
identity of the party conducting the draw, where it is conducted, or how much or
how little the non-consenting suspect resists. The use of videotaping has fun-
damentally changed the way courts address a wide-range of constitutional
claims-largely to the benefit of the police in the form of earlier dismissals and
grants of summary judgment.17 1 Such a videotaping procedure would inoculate
police against liability and aid in the process of making Fourth Amendment
determinations. Additionally, displays of intoxication in resisting the blood
draw could themselves be evidence while softening the suggestion of brutality
that often attends the idea of a compelled draw. Ultimately, this minor step
would give greater and more accurate weight to the totality of circumstances so
often touted in the various state court decisions.
This three-part solution represents a compromise between a wide range
of competing demands, and it carries its own drawbacks. Admittedly, it asks
policy-makers to proactively contain risks by affording DWI suspects protec-
tions beyond the minimums mandated by either the Constitution or most state
legislatures. Such a stance is clearly susceptible to "soft on crime" political
171 See generally John J. Gibbons and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Prison Reform: Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons: Confronting Confinement, 22 J.L. & POL. 385, 434
(2006) (discussing the role of videotaping as a protective measure in prisons); Matthew D. Thur-
low, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools ofJustice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFo. L. 771 (2005) (surveying the rise of police use of video cameras to document confessions);
Leah Walker, Comment, Will Video Kill the Trial Courts' Star?: How "Hot" Records Will
Change the Appellate Process, 19 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 449 (2009) (describing the effect of the
Supreme Court's acceptance of appellate review of videotape evidence in Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372 (2007), will effect future litigation).
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attacks. Additionally, it asks policy-makers to stretch already limited resources
to pay for more qualified phlebotomists, specially designated space, and essen-
tially prophylactic video equipment. This sort of "unnecessary" spending, or at
least not judicially-mandated spending, could expose policy-makers to addition-
al criticism in this era of severe budget shortfalls and looming municipal bank-
ruptcies. Most importantly, all of these suggestions would require policy-
makers to act upon a problem that may not otherwise be apparent until failure to
meet Fourth Amendment standards either allows a particularly notorious guilty
individual to walk free or results in enormous civil liability.
Still, these three simple suggestions represent the best way to ameliorate
the need for efficient, cost-effective procedures with the policy concerns set out
in Part IV. The goal of compelled blood draws is to secure evidence of intoxi-
cation to protect the public at large from drivers who operate their vehicle under
the influence of alcohol. A policy that afford as-yet innocent suspects the re-
spect of a well-qualified, detached technician in a medical environment will
produce concrete, conclusive evidence of intoxication devoid of the distasteful
appearance of forcibly taking a human being's bodily fluids. In those rare cases
in which these protections are not enough, the use of video evidence will help
courts correctly ascertain what happened, why it happened, and whether it com-
ported with the Fourth Amendment-thus furthering the paramount goal of pro-
curing good, reliable, constitutional evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Faced with a police officer conducting compelled blood draws in the
back of his cruiser, an Arizona trial judge opined, "[r]omantic though it may
sound, phlebotomy in the back seat by the dashboard lights is, in this humble
trial judge's opinion, unconstitutional."1 72 It is only a small and constitutionally
insignificant leap from the backseat of the cruiser in that case to the station
house in Johnston. Yet courts around the country continually disagree on the
latter while virtually all would take issue with former. The usually warrantless,
non-consenting invasion of the human body by force for the purpose of extract-
ing evidence of criminal activity represents a severe affront to human dignity
and bodily integrity. Though necessitated by the extreme social danger posed
by incidents of DWI, courts applying Schmerber nearly a half-century after its
decision should continually remember the significance of the seizure they are
asked to approve. Viewed from that perspective, the state responses to Schmer-
ber largely underestimate the severity of the task at hand. By demanding just a
bit more, these same courts can preserve or even improve the efficacy of BAC
evidence derived from compelled draws, while preserving the all-important
right to security in one's person enshrined as the first and most important right
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
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